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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j)(1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE I: Is it error for the trial court to admit fatally 
prejudicial testimony based on an unreliable hearsay statement? 
Questions as to the admissibility of evidence are governed by the 
abuse of discretion standard. Pearce v* Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489 
(Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions and rules are 
determinative: 
1. United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment; 
2. Utah State Constitution, Article I, §6; 
3. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rules 601 (c) and 803 (4). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiff and appellant Gail 0. Hansen ("Ms. Hansen") brought 
this action in the Third Judicial District Court to recover 
compensation for injuries she sustained as a result of an 
automobile collision. Ms. Hansen's vehicle was struck from behind 
by a vehicle driven by James Woo ("Woo"), who died during the 
pendency of this action of causes unrelated to the collision. (R. 
at 3, 12, 97-99. ) 
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Woo, through his personal representative, John. Heath, made a 
motion for summary judgment on the basis that his alleged 
unexpected blackout relieved him of any negligence. (R. at 44-96). 
This motion was denied. (R. at 131). 
Ms. Hansen made a motion for an order to strike certain 
hearsay statements relating to defendant's alleged blackout. (R. 
at 100-114). This motion was also denied. (R. at 131). 
Ms. Hansen made a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of 
Dr. Roger Freedman, as any opinion Dr. Freedman might have relating 
to Woo's alleged black-out arose from the defendant's impermissible 
hearsay that he had suffered a black-out. (R. at 346-353). Later, 
this same motion was made at trial. (R. at 556-557) Ms. Hansen's 
motions to exclude the medical record references to an alleged 
black-out and to exclude the testimony of Dr. Freedman regarding 
the alleged black-out were denied. (R. at 423, 559). Woo then 
made a motion for a directed verdict, which was denied. (R. at 
422). 
Statement of Facts 
1. On or about July 15, 1988 Plaintiff Hansen was severely 
injured when the vehicle she was driving was struck by a vehicle 
driven by Defendant Woo. (R. 3) 
2. At the scene of the collision, Woo did not offer any 
explanation for his erratic driving, which included swerving 
sharply to the left and then quickly correcting back hard to the 
right before crashing into Ms. Hansen's vehicle. Additionally, Woo 
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never mentioned any black-out to witnesses at the scene or to the 
paramedics who treated and questioned him in great detail about his 
medical conditions or problems immediately following the collision. 
(Defendant's Trial Exhibit Number 11, a true copy of which is 
attached as Exhibit "A") 
3. Nearly one hour later, at the hospital, Woo is reported 
to have stated that he believed he had "lost conciousness" 
momentarily, which statement was equated with a "syncope" or 
"syncopal episode" in the medical profession. (Defendant's Trial 
Exhibit Number 12, a true copy of which is attached as Exhibit "B") 
4. Ms. Hansen brought the subject personal injury action 
against Woo, who died during the pendency of the action of causes 
unrelated to the collision. (R. 2-8, 97-99) John Heath, in his 
capacity as personal representative of the estate of James Woo, was 
substituted as defendant. (R. 210-216, 224-225) 
5. Woo offered his alleged syncopal episode as a defense, 
claiming it relieved him of all liability since the purported 
syncope was allegedly unforeseeable and allegedly caused him to 
lose control over his vehicle. (R. 44-96) 
6. The evidence offered at trial in support of Woo's claim 
all stemmed from his self-serving hearsay statement made long after 
the collision, which possibly was innacurately understood or 
reported in the medical records. By the time Woo first mentions 
"losing conciousness," sufficient time had passed for him to 
reflect and consider the statement in the context of the crash. 
(See Defendant's Trial Exhibit Number 12, Exhibit f,Bff) 
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7. In pre-trial motions and at trial, including a motion to 
strike the hearsay statements, plaintiff objected to the use of any 
evidence which derived from this extremely prejudicial and 
inadmissible hearsay evidence. (R. 100-114, 336-353, 485-488.) 
Said motions were denied, and the judge admitted the evidence of 
alleged syncope as a "presumed" diagnosis in the nodical records, 
along with the testimony of Dr. Freedman based upon the records. 
Dr. Freedman had never treated nor examined Woo, but only reviewed 
the medical records, including Woo's hearsay statement, and later 
was allowed to testify to the probability of the alleged syncopal 
episode and its causes and foreseeability. (R. 505, 530-548) 
8. The trial court noted that Rule 803 (4) of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence seemed to offer support for allowing the hearsay 
statement into evidence. (R. 559.) Rule 601 (c) was also discussed 
in arguments for and against the admission of the evidence, and may 
have figured in the trial court's decision to admit the hearsay. 
(R. 479, 492-493) 
9. At trial, the jury accepted the testimony of Dr. 
Freedman, although based on speculations derived from hearsay, 
believing Woo blacked-out, and determined that he was not 
negligent. (R.463-464) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff/appellant Gail 0. Hansen respectfully requests this 
court to reverse the judgment entered against her and remand her 
claim for a new trial, because the trial court erred in admitting 
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impermissible hearsay evidence addressing the cause of the 
collision. Speculative medical testimony based upon this hearsay 
was then allowed to be entered against plaintiff in violation of 
her constitutional right to cross-examine all witnesses against 
her. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
INADMISSABLE HEARSAY USED AGAINST PLAINTIFF: The hearsay 
statement reportedly made by the defendant, that he had suffered a 
momentary black-out, was first made long after the collision, so as 
to raise grave suspicions of fabrication or misstatement. 
Defendant's ambiguous statement, as reported in the medical 
records, is impermissible hearsay because it was not within any 
exception to the hearsay rule and thus the trial court should have 
excluded it. If this hearsay statement, and all speculation based 
upon it, were properly excluded, then likewise, the medical 
testimony of Dr. Freedman about the alleged blackout necessarily 
would have been excluded. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
A VERDICT MAY BE SET ASIDE IF IMPROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE 
"HAD A SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE IN BRINGING ABOUT THE VERDICT" 
This Court has stated that "the fact alone that evidence was 
erroneously admitted [is not] sufficient to set aside a verdict 
unless it has 'had a substantial influence in bringing about the 
verdict.'" Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1985). The 
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logical corollary of this statement is that where* the evidence 
improperly admitted did have a "substantial influence in bringing 
about the verdict", the erroneous admission should be adequate 
grounds to set aside the verdict• 
In the instant case, the error manifest in the admission of 
Defendant Woo's self-serving exculpatory hearsay statement at the 
hospital a long time after the collision most decidesdly did have a 
"substantial influence in bringing about the verdict." If the 
court had excluded the challenged evidence, defendant's liability 
was without question. 
The trial court's decision to admit the challenged evidence 
permitted a great deal of medical speculation about: Woo's alleged 
syncopal episode. Most damaging was the testimony of Dr. Freedman 
regarding the alleged black-out. Had all evidence derived from 
Woo's self-serving hearsay statement properly been excluded, the 
outcome of the trial would definitely have been in Ms. Hansen's 
favor. 
POINT II. 
WOO'S STATEMENT REGARDING THE ALLEGED "BLACK-OUT" 
WAS HEARSAY NOT WITHIN ANY EXCEPTION 
Following the collision, Defendant Woo made a statement 
that he "suddenly lost consciousness." (See Exhibit "B".) 
This statement was first made after an ambulance had taken him to 
the hospital. Sufficient time had elapsed before Woo first 
mentioned blacking-out to raise suspicions of fabrication. From 
this statement, a great deal of speculation about the medical 
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records and in the testimony of Dr. Freedman followed, all 
suggesting that Woo may have suffered a syncopal episode. This 
medical speculation was before the jury, and clearly influenced the 
jury, as they found Woo was not negligent. 
This statement was inadmissible hearsay and the trial court 
properly should have excluded it. Exclusion would result in 
precluding Dr. Freedman1s testimony as well. Plaintiff was denied 
the right to a fair trial by the trial court's error in admitting 
the testimony. 
A. Due Process Requires Adequate Opportunity to Cross-Examine 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
the Utah State Constitution, Article I, § 6 both require that a 
litigant be afforded due process. An integral part of due process 
is the right to cross-examine witnesses to explore the basis and 
credibility of their statements. The California Court of Appeals 
has stated that to "deny a litigant the right to cross-examine a 
witness who testifies against him is a denial of due process of 
law." [Citations omitted.] Long v. Long, 59 Cal. Rptr. 790, 792 
(1967). In the present case, plaintiff was denied her right to 
cross-exam Defendant Woo on the basis and credibility of his 
statement, and on certain critical details of his statement, such 
as when the alleged "black-out" actually occurred. For example, 
did the "black-out" occur before the collision, as the trial court 
seemed to assume, because of the collision, or after the collision? 
How long did the "black-out" last? Did the defendant have any 
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warning of the impending "black-out"? Assuming he did "black-out," 
did he regain consciousness in sufficient time to avoid the 
collision? Plaintiff's right to cross-examination on these and 
other numerous details about the statement which may have 
drastically altered its effect at trial was precluded by the 
court's ruling allowing the hearsay into evidence. 
The statement made by Woo, as recorded by the individual 
writing in his medical chart, is so completely ambiguous and 
uncertain that to allow it to come in, at face value and with no 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, is a clear denial of 
justice to the innocent plaintiff who is severely injured, and is 
then denied recovery because of the statement. There are manifest 
possibilities left unexplored in the bare statement that Woo "lost 
conciousness suddenly", most of which would result in liability to 
Woo, and recovery to Ms. Hansen. 
If Woo had in fact fallen asleep briefly, he would still be 
liable to Ms. Hansen. If he had "blacked-out" momentarily a minute 
before the collision, but had regained conciousness in sufficient 
time to control his car and avoid the collision, he would still be 
liable. If the "black-out" had happened as a result of the 
collision, or in the moment just after the collision, he would 
still have been liable. If Woo had felt the impending "black-out", 
but had ignored the warning, he would still be liable to Ms. Hansen 
for her injuries. 
There are ample explanations for the ambiguous statement 
reported in the medical record which would still make Woo liable to 
8 
Ms. Hansen for the injuries she suffered in the collision. None of 
these explanations could be explored, because Woo had died. 
Consequently, the statement came in, unchallenged and untested, and 
completely foreclosed Ms. Hansen's right to recover. 
This result is a travesty of justice, an example of exalting 
form over substance. The trial court, following defendant's 
urging, allowed what it construed to be "the rules of evidence" to 
triumph over common-sense and a realistic application of truth to 
the facts, and in the process allowed an innocent injured party to 
be left to suffer without recourse. 
One of the most fundamental aspects of our American judicial 
system is the adversarial nature of proceedings, allowing litigants 
from both sides the opportunity to fully probe any statements 
offered against them, to examine the truth of the statements and to 
explore the circumstantial parameters of the statements. Courts 
and litigants rely on open confrontation, incisive cross-
examination, a serious oath, the threat of perjury for any false 
statements and the gravity of the situation to encourage a truthful 
and full disclosure so that the jury might have the fullest basis 
on which to consider the case. 
It has been stated that "the hearsay rule exists primarily to 
protect a party's right to cross-examine adverse testimony." 
(Bergman, Ambiguity; The Hidden Hearsay Danger Almost Nobody Talks 
About,75 Kentucky Law Journal 841. [Citing McCormick on Evidence 
and Wigmore's Evidence].) 
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In the absence of adequate opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant — the person who made the out-of-court statement — 
about the facts surrounding the statement, it is likely that the 
statement, as admitted into evidence, will contain serious 
ambiguities and inherent defects which cannot be fully probed, even 
by asking questions of the witnesses who convey the hearsay. In 
most cases, and particularly so in this case, the person who 
conveys the hearsay to the fact-finder has no further information 
about the statement. As a result, the statement is presented to 
the jury full of prejudicial confusion and misrepresentations. 
Professor Tribe has elucidated the purposes underlying the 
hearsay rule and its exceptions in his theory, coined the 
"Testimonial Triangle." (Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 Harvard 
Law Review 957.) Professor Tribe's thesis is that courts and 
attorneys should avoid rigid application of the exceptions to the 
hearsay rule and focus instead on the purposes of the rule and 
whether the proffered statement circumvents the valid reasons 
behind the rule. 
The Testimonial Triangle involves an analysis of the mental 
process which occurs when a hearsay statement is uttered and 
accepted. To accept a statement made by an out of court declarant, 
the trier of fact must begin at a point of the triangle, called 
Point A, which represents what the declarant said. Point B 
represents the declarant's belief in the truth of what he has said. 
The path from Point A to Point B must necessarily pass through 
questions as to the declarant's sincerity, as well as any ambiguity 
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inherent in the statement. The third point of the triangle (Point 
C) represents the conclusions which follow from the declarant's 
statement. From Point B to Point C, one questions the declarant's 
memory and perception of the event. Id. at 959. At any point 
along the triangle, if the trier of fact is unable to effectively 
assess the declarant, his sincerity, any ambiguity in his 
statement, the declarant's memory or lack of it regarding the 
statement, and the declarant's perception of the event spoken of, 
a hearsay problem arises. 
In this case, Woo's statement, first documented in the 
Veterans Administration Medical Certificate was that "he was 
driving out of VA [from an earlier appointment]. On 7th East 
involved in multi-car accident. Patient states he was driving, 
suddenly lost consciousness [without] warning." (See Exhibit "B".) 
A number of questions arise surrounding the correct understanding 
and transmission of the statement. Woo had a communication 
barrier, as English was his second language. This problem must 
certainly have been heightened by his age, ill-health and the 
injuries and confusion resulting from the collision. 
It is likely the statement he made was that the last thing he 
remembers was turning onto 7th East coming from the VA hospital due 
to retrograde amnesia which he may have suffered as a result of the 
collision. With the communication difficulties, made worse on this 
occasion by health problems and stress, the statement written by 
the admissions nurse is far from reliable. 
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It is also significant that the Utah EMS Incident Report, 
filled out earlier, at the scene of the collision, contains the 
ambulance driver's impression, which was not attributed to Woo, 
that his "PRE-HOSPITAL IMPRESSION" was "poss. syncope." (See 
Exhibit "A".) It is very possible the idea for the explanation 
subsequently offered by Woo at the hospital originetlly came from 
the ambulance driver's suggestion. 
It is this type of ambiguity about the origin of the 
statement, its veracity, its communication to the person who wrote 
the report and the details of the statement which the plaintiff 
should have had the opportunity to explore on cross-examination. 
Exactly when did the alleged black-out occur? Before, as a result 
of, or after the collision? Did Woo actually fall asleep briefly, 
or was he distracted by another health problem to which he was 
subject, such as violent coughing, excessive acidity in his 
stomach, shortness of breath or irregular heart beats? Should he, 
in the exercise of reasonable care, have been able to avoid the 
collision? At trial, plaintiff's counsel could not ask any of 
these questions, for no one could give a complete answer, since the 
only person with full knowledge of the facts behind the statement 
was James Woo, who had died. 
According to Professor Tribe, the flaws in an out-of-court 
statement such as Woo's should be considered, apart from whether it 
can be made to fit into one of the established exceptions. In this 
way, a more flexible and realistic application of the hearsay rule 
may be reached, rather than a mechanistic, rote application of the 
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rule and its exceptions, which often results in confusion, 
misapplication and injustice. 
To utterly deny plaintiff her recovery because the trial court 
interpreted the rule to allow such a statement into evidence, when 
the rule doesn't anticipate such serious defects in communication, 
recordation and transmission of the statement is to exalt form over 
substance and to celebrate inflexible rules over true justice. 
This result should not be countenced by this court. 
The frequent recitation of an assumed "black-out" in medical 
records and even Dr. Freedman's testimony resulted in plaintiff 
being greatly prejudiced. Plaintiff lost her right to cross-
examine the key adverse witness, who gave testimony which, standing 
alone, defeated her claim. Consequently, the admission of this 
statement was error which requires reversal of the trial court's 
judgment and a remand for a new trial. 
B. Rule 601 (&) Does Not Allow the Admission of Woo's Statement 
One of the primary arguments raised by counsel for the defense 
in support of the admissibility of Woo's statement and all 
derivative statements following it was Rule 601 (c) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. (R. 488) This exception to the hearsay rule 
seems to have figured in the court's determination to allow the 
statement into evidence. 
Rule 601 (c) (2), however, provides a caveat which precludes 
a hearsay statement which might otherwise come in under Rule 601 
(c) from being admitted if it "was made under circumstances such as 
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to indicate its lack of trustworthiness." No controlling authority 
is found for interpreting a "lack of trustworthiness" on facts 
similar to the instant case. 
Rule 601 (c) is one of the few instances in the Utah Rules of 
Evidence in which the Utah Rules deviate from the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. The reason for this deviation, according to the Advisory 
Committee Note, was that the "Dead Man" statute in Utah had been 
repealed, and some compensation for it was required, which hadn't 
been provided in the Federal Rules. The note states further that 
the "two paragraphs [subparagraphs (b) and (c)] have been taken 
from Sections 1227 and 1261 of the California Evidence Code." 
(Utah Court Rules Annotated, 1992, Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 
601, Advisory Committee Note.) 
In the absence of some controlling interpretation of Rule 601 
(c) from this jurisdiction, one may take guidance from the 
identical passages in the California Evidence Code. (See, e.g. 
State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d 760, 764 (Utah 1984); State v. Gray, 717 
P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah 1986).) The Law Revision Comments in Deering 
California Code Annotated, Evidence § 1261, state that "[c]ertain 
safeguards — i.e., personal knowledge, recent perception, and 
circumstantial evidence of trustworthiness -- are included in the 
section to provide some protection for the party acfainst whom the 
statements are offered, for he has no opportunity to test the 
hearsay by cross-examination." [emphasis added.] 
The drafters of the original, identical, provision to that 
found in Rule 601 (c) (2) recognized the potential dangers of 
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allowing hearsay statements of a deceased individual to come into 
evidence, and provided a safeguard against this in the form of a 
provision that the statement is: 
inadmissible under this section if the 
statement was made under circumstances such as 
to indicate its lack of trustworthiness. 
The "lack of trustworthiness" in the situation surrounding the 
making of the statement is the critical consideration. In a 
criminal case involving Rule 804 (b) (5) of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, the court analyzed the "catch all" or "residual" 
exception which allows hearsay if it has "circumstantial guarantees 
of trustworthiness" equivalent to the other exceptions of Rule 804. 
U.S. v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341 (3rd Cir, 1978). Since the focal 
point of that case was the "circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness", which is analogous to the provision of Rule 601 
(c) (2) forbidding the admission of an otherwise admissible 
statement if it "was made under circumstances such as to indicate 
its lack of trustworthiness," some guidance may be had from the 
Bailey court's interpretation of circumstances indicating 
trustworthiness or lack of same. The court stated that: 
the trustworthiness of a statement should be 
analyzed by evaluating not only the facts 
corroborating the veracity of the statement, 
but also the circumstances in which the 
declarant made the statement and the incentive 
he had to speak truthfully or falsely. 
Further, consideration should be given to 
factors bearing on the reliability of the 
reporting of the hearsay by the witness. Id. 
at 349. [Emphasis added.] 
Woo's statement was made sometime after the collision, and was 
made under circumstances which would "indicate its lack of 
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trustworthiness", or at the very least, its substantial ambiguity, 
precluding unquestioned acceptance of the statement as truth. The 
fact that the statement was made some substantial time after the 
collision, and that the ambulance driver may have suggested the 
excuse, and the fact that the Woo has some difficulty with 
communication under the best circumstances, even more so under the 
stress of a traumatic event and that the statement itself was 
ambiguous, in that it contained no clear indication whether it 
referred to an alleged "black-out" before, because of, or after the 
collision, all bring the "trustworthiness" of Woo's statement into 
question. 
Because the statement was self-serving, made out of court 
under circumstances which make its reliability questionable, and 
because it could not be probed on cross-examination, its admission 
into evidence was error. As a result of the statement being 
admitted, plaintiff was denied her right to cross-csxamination and 
was gravely prejudiced. Consequently, the judgment of the trial 
court should be reversed, and this case remanded for a new trial. 
C. The Exception From Rule 803 (4) Offers No Justification 
For the Admission of Woo's Hearsay Statement 
Another exception to the hearsay rule which the court relied 
upon to justify the admission of Woo's statement is the exception 
provided by Rule 803 (4), which allows statements made for the 
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, "insofar as they are 
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment" to be admissible. 
Once again, little controlling authority exists to elucidate Utah's 
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Rule 803 (4), and none of it is relevant to the current inquiry. 
But, as this Court has stated: "[s]ince the advisoury committee 
generally sought to achieve uniformity between Utah's rules and the 
federal rules, this Court looks to the interpretations of the 
federal rules by the federal courts to aid in interpreting the Utah 
rules." [Citations omitted.] State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1317 
(Utah 1986). 
The language of the rule itself is very clear that to admit 
the proffered hearsay statement, under Rule 803 (4), the hearsay 
must be "reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." Federal 
courts have almost universally interpreted this to mean that 
statements as to the fault or cause of an accident or collision do 
not become admissible under this rule merely because they are made 
to a physician. No evidence was offered that Woo's statement that 
he believed he had suffered a "black-out" was "reasonably pertinent 
to diagnosis or treatment." 
One court interpreting this provision stated plainly that a 
"statement as to how an injury occurred would not qualify under the 
'statements of physical condition* exception to the hearsay rule". 
Walker v. West Coast Fast Freight, Inc., 233 F.2d 939 (9th Cir, 
1956). This principle has been more recently and clearly stated, 
in U.S. v. Narciso, 446 F.Supp 252 (SD Mich 1977). In Narciso the 
court stated that Rule 803 (4) is: 
limited to facts related which are 'reasonably pertinent 
to diagnosis or treatment; f it has never been held to 
apply to accusations of personal fault, either in a civil 
or criminal context. Thus, the commentators have said 
that fa party's statement that he was struck by an 
automobile would qualify but not his statement that the 
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car was driven through a red light.'" [Emphasis added.] 
Id. at 289. 
The court in Narciso went on to explain that even where 
the doctor's motive was further diagnosis, the underlying 
assumption of the rule requires the Court to inquire as 
to the declarant's motivation for giving the information. 
If his motive is to disclose the information to aid in 
his own diagnosis and treatment, this, it is assumed, 
guarantees the statement's trustworthiness. However, if 
the declarant makes the statement while under the 
impression that he is being asked to indicate 'who was 
responsible' for what happened, his response may very 
well be accusatory in nature and any inherent reliability 
of such a statement is thereby destroyed." [Emphasis 
added.] Id. 
The case at bar presents a situation which is directly 
analogous to the reasoning in Narciso — the doctor may have used 
the hearsay statement in some way for purposes of diagnosis and 
treatment, but it is also highly likely, given the circumstances of 
the statement, that the statement was made for purposes of 
indicating "who was responsible" for what happened, such that "any 
inherent reliability of such a statement is thereby destroyed." No 
inquiry was made by the court as to the reason for the statement. 
Beyond the fact that Woo's veracity is open to question, and could 
not be cross-examined, the statement had inherent pivotal 
ambiguities, as to the exact time the alleged "black-out" occurred 
and the severity and duration of it. 
The foundation and purpose of Rule 803 (4) is to admit 
statements made to physicians for the purpose of care and 
treatment. Here the statement is not intimately involved with 
diagnosis, care or treatment, but rather is taken out of that 
specific context and artificially made to travel backward in time 
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to the collision scene to be used as a "liability" defense. The 
spirit and letter of the exception of the hearsay rule is to permit 
such statements in the diagnosis, care and treatment context 
existing at the time the statement is uttered. This purpose is 
violated when the statement is used for another reason, in an 
earlier time, for the purpose of denying liability. 
This argument is most compelling in this instance, where the 
very admission of the statement goes not to a question of 
defendant's degree of fault but rather directly and totally defeats 
the plaintiff's claim. To permit this hearsay in this instance is 
to sanction a denial of due process and approve manifest injustice 
against innocent litigants. 
Given the factors which directly question the value of the 
statement, it was error for the court to admit the hearsay 
statement and the mass of medical record speculation derived 
thereunder. No tests verified a syncopal episode and no doctor 
ever diagnosed it. This entire defense, which completely defeated 
plaintiff's claim, arose out of a single, self-serving statement by 
the defendant made a sufficient time after the collision to invite 
the opportunity for fabrication. Suspiciously, the statement was 
made after Woo heard the suggestion of this excuse offered by the 
ambulance driver. 
The Narciso court, in discussing the theory and purposes 
behind the hearsay rule and its numerous exceptions, noted that 
most hearsay exceptions have a degree of built in reliability and 
that this reliability is heightened by the availability of the 
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hearsay witness to testify as to the reliability of the statement. 
The court pointed out, however, that: 
in the circumstances of this case, glib 
reference to the right of cross-examination of 
the hearsay witness is hardly a solution nor 
does it offer an effective substitute for the 
cross-examination of the declarant. The 
cross-examination of a single hearsay witness 
as to the circumstances surrounding the 
declaration is a far cry from what is 
necessary here for a full explanation and 
exposition of the truth. 
Id. at 291. Again, the analogy is compelling to the facts of the 
instant case. 
The only possibility the plaintiff had to impeach the fatal 
statement was to question Dr. Freedman, a doctor who had never 
treated nor examined Woo and could only comment on the records 
written by other doctors, years before. Obviously, the ability to 
delve into the subtleties, ambiguities and possible alternate 
explanations of the Woo statement were absolutely lacking. 
For this reason, the admission of evidence deriving from Woo's 
self-serving, exculpatory statement was error, and justifies 
reversal for a new trial because the evidence which was 
"erroneously admitted... 'had a substantial influence in bringing 
about the verdict.1" Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489 (Utah 1989). 
Plaintiff/appellant Hansen respectfully requests that this court 
grant her request for a reversal and remand so that she might have 
a trial untainted by the improper hearsay evidence. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that this Court should reverse 
the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial because: 
1. Erroneously admitted evidence is an adequate grounds upon 
which to base a reversal, since the evidence "had a substantial 
influence in bringing about the verdict"; 
2. The hearsay statement of Defendant Woo was inadmissible 
as it did not come within the exceptions provided by either Rule 
601 (c) or 803 (4). 
For these reasons, plaintiff respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted this j \ day of August, 1992. 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
Mitchell R. Jensen 
Jcjnn Farrell Fay 
Jim Mouritsen 
Attorneys for the plaintiff and 
appellant, Gail 0. Hansen 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
J 1 . L O C A T I O N (Stf«et) ~ ~ ^ <^ (City) 
I D Mass Gathering J9~?'')& VM / fO (Z 
4. PATIENT NAME (Lastf ' 
i,) OQ 
JfilSl) (Ml) 
Parent/Guardian 
7. P A T I E N T A O O R E S S (Street) (City/State) 
2. DISPATCHED AS 
-z£ 
S. UNIT LOCATION ON DISPATCH 
8. CAUSE OF INJURY 
3. RUN * O Duplicate 
6. OATE 7 / / . - / C 
Mo Day Yr 
9. EMS SERVICE 
d 
10. AGE 
4. DESC 
11. SEX 
/1 
12. CHIEF COMPLAINT 
Ma ^& L+^= JM>*" J •+ 
13. T06CENE 
1 Si 10-39 
2 D 10-40 
FROM SCENE 
1 D 10-39 
2 gQO-40 
1 . SCRIPTION OF PROBLEM 15. MILITARY TIME 
/Vn
 0 /oJ,^^5 » v \ i _ > r^ 
Incident Time 
J '-?- Dispatched 
Sfti- f/.i-^B-n^l 
Unit Ervoute 
Arrived Scene 
V 2 
/' Vi> 
~P7s 
ZZ3Z 
Left Scene 
17. PASTHISTl 
no* 
Arrived Hosp 
16. O0OMETER READING 
18. MEDICATION HISTORY 
A 
Beginning 
£M C. At Scene 
19. ALLERGIES 
A. 
Ending 
Miles Ortven 
20. PULSE 21. BLOOD PRESSURE 22. RESPIRATORY 22. SKIN 24. NEUROLOGICAL 25. GLASGOW COMA SCALE 
Initial Time 
Repeat Time 
Repeat Time 
Repeat Time 
Repeat Time 
Repeat Time 
Rate , 
•SLL 
Initiate 
Rate Repeat 
%y Initial I I 
Repeat 
Rate 
Rate 
Rate 
Rate 
Radial Pulse 
1 CS^Reg. 4 D Irreg. 
1 'O Absent 
3 D Strong 
Repeat Repeat 
Capillary Refill 
1 O Absent 
2 O Delayed 
3 STNormal S f  
orfditior 
Motor Function 
Right ' Left 
1 ^ Moves Arms^C 
2J% Moves Legs " 
Repeat Repeat 
Repeat Repeat 
C n n 
tDMoret iQPale 
2ADry 2 O Cyan 
3^Wai 
t£ 
Repeat Repeat 4 O Coot 
3 D fled 
4 ^ Normal 
Initial Ti 
Repeat 
Neck Veins 
1 O Distended 
2 D Flat 
3k^Nofmal 
Respiratory Effort 
0 O Absent 
1 O Shallow 
2 O Retractive 
3 D Air Hunger 
4 & Normal 
Sensory Present' 
Distal to Injury 
Yes AH No 
Pulse I 
Distal t / Injury 
D Yes / D No 
Pupils 
Right Left 
1,JSJ Reactive *<S 
2 D Unreactive D 
1 O Dilated D 
2 D Mldrange D 
3^2 Pinpoint Q, 
H*R c v>\)c_ 
Rhythm Changes 
E O 
Y P 
E E 
N 
V R 
E E 
R S 
B P 
A O 
L N S 
E 
M R O E 
T S O P 
R O 
N S 
E 
/rr 
None 
To Pain 
To Speech 
Spontaneously 
incomprehensible 
Inappropriate 
Confused 
Oriented 
Flaccid 
Extends to Pain 
Flexes to Pain 
Localized Pain 
Obeys Commands 
GLASGOW SCORE 
27. MEDICATIONS Time Dose Time Dose MEDICATIONS Dose Time 0034 28. IV. FLUID AMT. INFUSED 
n. \LK ~Tk& 
29. ACTIONS TAKEN 
//yr- -jH* ]/Z 
C ~Cr>l(rfr sfeS 
31. PREHOSPITAL IMPRESSION 
fe><"«> CI'/ »•> CO 
tapp 
CRAMS SCORE 
CIRCULATION 
OC- Normal 
1-Delayed 
0 • No Cap Refill 
ABDOMEN 
%• Not Tender 
•'V- Tender 
0 - Rigid or 
Penetrating Injury 
SPEECH 
%< Normal 
"7 • Confuted 
0 -Non or 
Unintelligible 
RESPIRATION 
*-Normal 
T-Labored 
0 * Absent 
MOTOR 
JZ • Obeys Commands 
1 • Response to Pain 
0 • Postures or No 
Response 
I 
30. INJURY/ILLNESS CODE j£Sf [check all 
TOTAL 
CRAMS 
SCORE Vt> 
Head Trauma 
Spinal Trauma 
Central T.auma 
Extremity Trauma 
Other Trauma 
Suspected M I 
VFlb. 
Other Cardiac 
Abdominal Illness 
12 
15 
17 
18 
Alcohol 
Burn 
OB/GYN 
Poison/Drug 
Psychiatric 
Respiratory 
Stroke/CVA 
Other Medical 
7SL 32. TYPE Of EMS RESPONSE (check all thaf ly) ft Paramedics Ground Ambulance 
Non-transport Team 
1st Respond (CIM/QRU) 
5 Air-Helicopter 
Air-Fixed Wing 
Water Ambulance 
Ski Patrol 
9 I Other 
33. MEDICAL CONTROL 
Hosp: dH. 
Medical Control Phys. 
Ay 
Transported 
h? Yes 
O No 
Hosp. Delivered' 
J A 
Contacted Resource Hosp. 
1 H From Scene 
2 \2 In Transit 
3 D Used Standing Orders 
Medical Control Nurse 
Disposition Condition 
D Close D Pat Choice D Sp Fac 
Advanced Unit 
PM/EMT 
PM/EMT 
<;/ 
Basic Unit 
<? \rs 
Ufle 
34. MISC. 
[CPR. INITIATED BY: 
1 D Citizen 
2 D Other 
COURSE 
1 D CPR on ER 
Arrival /[ 
2 D Perfusing .on 
ER Arrival 
Airway Inserted 
PM/EMT 
PM/EMT Completing Form 
35. TREATMENT 
1 
2 
3] 
4 | 
Did citizen have CPR Training? 
1 D Yes 2$ No 3 D unk 
Was ArreXWitnessed 
D YeVdirectly D No 
MINUTES FROM 
JXOLLAPSE TO: 
1 Agency Call 
2 C P R Initiation 
-Min. 
.Min. 
^ < i _ n t . . — / * - — . 
b£ 
Assisted Ventilation 
Bleeding Controlled 
Blood Tubes Drawn 
15 
16 
_Gai 
M A S T Inflated 
NGTube 
O B ' * 
Burn Care 
Cervical tmmobil 
C P R 
Defib. 
Endotrachial Intub 
Esophageal Obturator / 
Extrication Equipment 2 DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT "B" 
2 DEFENDANT'S I EXHIBIT t Addendum to VA Form 10-10 and 10-1 Or iv.No.C89-662 VETERANS ADMINISTRATION MEDICAL CERTIFICATE 
Patient Telephone #: 
#-s* 
PORTANT: History, and physical findings must be recorded in sufficient detail to support the diagnosis. 
MS-ft rt'21 AM PM 31- Q M D F 
5. ON ARRIVAL VETERAN MAS. 
•
AMBU-
LATORY 
B. 
| I STRETCHER 
2^, WHEEL-
[ I CHAIR 
6. IS APPLICATION THE RESULT OF INJURY? 
(It "Yes" give dste and cause) 
0 N ° D YES 
4ISTORY 
a r^j n fiO nofa Q N O N E L J HERBICIOES [ J RADIATION Ptf QH tOCUJ Q ASBESTOS D 
E. OTHER (Specify) 
K+ c*f OA V SO 7 ^ -Gx\T moaUtef fc\ nruAt. c<xc n r a r U V - ficchirrt ttzAej U cOru <ArL ite. 
ar. PcUu. ffecte /V /J car c ro jR^ ^ />W3LL/I> , JcwrUC* c r t y f r w c ^ ^ <**</», nm\kirt fvfe 
xift tbArH. O-ccZ/arn/AuHcZlvA nararr^hti &fr<cvi. . fit hx) hvs W< c /UJ Of P. U?F*/& 
»HYSICAL EXAMINATION ' \ A. HEIGHT ' ! B. W E I G H T J C. TEMPERATURE • O. PULSE • £• RESPIRATION ! F. Bl_OC 
on reverse) 
. BL OD PRESSURE 
g c rcfrucd) 0 & t i ^ , / ^w^» • 0/KJL GLSL. 
q » i f ^ &S , J - ^ Q . , r r a c i ^ / x u » . Sw2 s 5VL < V , A ^ i u i / f c l / . 
A&l kxA^n* 0 /2/Aix: .*rfat~LJj 
A772.?> -flf/irfy X £ . fl^Aj^ >&Jl , mnprtclr fitM) f o > , ^ - £ / I 
n&- Ao pntumn C-ttT. fait \lfUA- fltr.r> tr> r*>
 } CCXA& cL*r C=l 
(Continue on reverse) 
IAGNOSJS: 
3MWENOATIONS*: (Include may in RECO MENOA 
Admit WD: 
D A I : . . . 
LABORATORY 
X-RAY 
EKG 
OTHER 
nclude n  tndt ested procedures, medicmUons, dmt, or other 
tollovMip instructions) 
.to Dr:. 
Scheduled Surgery Date: 
11. VETERAN'S PHYSICAL STATUS (Check expropriate columns) 
A. CAN DRESS AND USE TOILET FACILITIES WITHOUT ASSISTAWCE 
a CAK CO UP AND DOWN STAIRS 
C. CAN FEED SELF WITHOUT ASSISTANCE 
D. IS CONTINENT 
E. IS MENTALLY COMPETENT 
F. IS AMBULATORY (Omit U Item 5«, is checked) 
G. IS NOT AMBULATORY BUT CAN USE A WHEELCHAIR 
H. NEEDS AN ATTENDANT DURING TRAVEL 
L HAS A RELATIVE FOR AN ATTENDANT 
YES NO 
SIGNATURE AND ADDRESS OF NON-VA PHYSICIAN 128. PHONE NO. J . MODE OF TRAVEL (Fill in il spectsl IrsnsporUtton is required) 
Patient's Condition on Discharge:, 
12C. DATE 
ACTION INDICATEO (To be completed by VA Personnel) 
HOSPITALIZATION 
EMERGENT L J URGENT L J GENERAL 
ADMIT L J PLACE IN PBC STATUS 
L J NOT REQUIRED 
i l S C H E D U L E 
15. 
P I OOMICILIARY CARE D MED. ELfG. D MEO. INELIG. 
P I NURSING HOME CARE REQUIRED D D 
OUTPATIENT TREATMENT 
MED LJ S U R D PSY I I OENT L J NOT REQUIRED 
1UIRED TO OBVIATE THE NEED FOR HOSPITALIZATION? LZJ Y E S Q N O 
AOMIT TO CARE L J REF££JTO COMM. SOURCES (Indicate) 
17. SIGNATURE OF VA OFFICIAL 
EXHIBIT "C" 
ROGER H. BULLOCK #485 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 (gy-i 
Th.rc J.vfi'cra: District 
APR 0 9 1992 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GAIL 0. HANSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN HEATH, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of James Woo, deceased, 
Defendant. 
JUDQCENT ON SPECIAL 
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF 
DEFENDANT 
Civil No. C89-662 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
The above entitled action having come on for jury trial, 
Hon. Kenneth Rigtrup presiding, on March 31 through April 3, 1992, 
and plaintiff being present in person and represented by counsel, 
John F. Fay, and defendant being present in person and represented 
by counsel, Roger H. Bullock and Elizabeth L. Willey, and a jury 
having been duly impaneled, and evidenced adduced by both sides, 
and the jury having been instructed in the law and having 
deliberated and returned its special verdict as follows: 
3/103681 
1176.868 
1. Was James Woo negligent in the accident of July 15, 
1988? 
Yes No X 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Defendant John Heath, Personal Representative of the Estate of 
James Woo, deceased, does have and recover judgment in his favor 
and against plaintiff on plaintiff's complaint, no cause of action, 
_ 9° Afb. 
together with taxable costs of court in the amount of $ JTo ~* . 
DATED this 9 ""ctay of Cl^/<cJ\ 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
V 
Kenneth/Rigtrup, p)istj?ict Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was mailed postage prepaid this / day of 
April, 1992, to: 
John F. Fay 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
310 East 4500 South #620 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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